Extended deterrence poses challenges for credibility. Would the United States really risk harm to its own territory and citizens to defend allies abroad? Signaling offers one option to make such commitments more credible. This presentation will cover the concept of signaling, including sunk cost and hand-tying signals. Next, it will provide an overview of historical US extended deterrence signaling, with a focus on Cold War Europe. Finally, it will discuss US extended deterrence signaling in the cases of Ukraine and Taiwan and how they are different form Cold War Europe. 

Roseanne McManus is an Associate Professor in the Political Science Department at Penn State. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Her research focuses on international security and particularly on the question of how states are able to credibly signal their intentions in the context of ongoing or potential international conflict. Her book, Statements of Resolve: Achieving Coercive Credibility in International Conflict, came out from Cambridge University Press in 2017. She is an Associate Editor for the journal Security Studies, and her articles have appeared in journals such as the American Political Science Review, International Organization, and the Journal of Politics. Before pursuing an academic career, she was a Senior Analyst at the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

This seminar series is organised within the program on American politics and international security by Institut d’Estudis Nord-americans (IEN) and IBEI.

🔎 Check the first semester's agenda here.